The Dilemma of Autonomy (In Which the Problems of Responsibility and Free Will Are Presented) --
Setting Up the Problem(s): The Dilemma of Autonomy --
Defending the Problem as a Problem: The Metaphysical Stance --
The Real Self View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility is Examined and Criticized) --
Relating the Problems of Free Will and Responsibility to Determinism --
Avoiding Autonomy: Developing the Idea of an Agent's Real Self --
Problems with the Real Self View --
The Autonomy View (In Which an Autonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Examined and Criticized) --
The Apparent (but Only Apparent) Autonomy of Valuing Selves --
Autonomy as the Ability to Make Radical Choices --
The (Non) Desirability of Autonomy --
A Last Voice in Favor of Autonomy: The Skeptic's Perspective --
The Reason View (In Which a Nonautonomous Conception of Free Will and Responsibility Is Proposed) --
The Reason View Compared with the Autonomy View --
The Reason View Compared with the Real Self View --
The Reason View as an Intermediary between the Other Views --
The Asymmetry of the Reason View --
The Reason View Applied --
Blameworthiness According to the Reason View --
The Unity and Spirit of the Reason View --
Ability and Possibility (In Which the Implications of Determinism for Responsibility Are Discussed) --
Determinism and the Reason View --
Conditional Analyses of Ability --
An Alternative Characterization of Ability --
