Includes bibliographical references (pages 257-270) and index.

"Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of executives' power to influence their own pay - and of the structural defects in corporate governance that give them this power. As this book demonstrates, boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried give a richly detailed account of how pay practices - from option plans to retirement benefits - have decoupled compensation from performance and camouflaged both the amount and the performance-insensitivity of pay. They show that flaws in pay arrangements and the pay-setting process have been widespread and systemic. These problems have hurt shareholders both by increasing pay levels and, even more important, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives."--Jacket.

committed to retain,20170930,20421231,HathiTrust,https://www.hathitrust.org/shared_print_program,AEU,HathiTrust Shared Print commitment 2017

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