Includes bibliographical references (pages 195-216) and index.

Francis Fukuyama's criticism of the Iraq war put him at odds with neoconservatives both within and outside the Bush administration. Here he explains how, in its decision to invade Iraq, the Bush administration failed in its stewardship of American foreign policy, in making preventive war the central tenet of its foreign policy, in misjudging the global reaction to its exercise of "benevolent hegemony," and in failing to appreciate the difficulties involved in large-scale social engineering. Providing a history of neoconservative thought since the 1930s, Fukuyama argues that the movement's legacy is a complex one that can be interpreted quite differently than it was after the end of the Cold War. He proposes a new approach to American foreign policy, in which the positive aspects of the neoconservative legacy are joined with a more realistic view of how to use American power around the world.--From publisher description.

SACFinal081324