Includes bibliographical references (pages 149-166) and index.

Written entirely by individuals who served between mid-2004 and mid-2005 at Headquarters, Multinational Force--Iraq, in Baghdad's Green Zone, the eight chapters of this volume document the failures of the American occupation of Iraq, summarized by editor Mowle as consisting particularly of "lack of cross-functional strategic planning, insufficient understanding of the situation, and insufficient cross-functional control over command and execution." The text focuses on the period of the existence of the Iraqi Interim Government, from the June 2004 "handover of sovereignty" to the selection of the Iraqi Transitional Government in May 2005 and contains chapters that discuss political failures of planning, occupational authority attempts to develop intelligence, the work of training the Iraqi Security Forces, the role of elections in bringing about a government that occupation forces hoped would be seen as legitimate by Iraqis, and the lack of strategic thinking concerning the opportunities opened up by elections and the new governme.

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