Shipping list no.: 2015-0267-P.

"PIN: 105174-000"--Page 4 of cover.

Includes bibliographical references (page 59).

As the year 1965 began, U.S. policymakers were deeply worried about the situation in Vietnam and divided about what should be done about it. Many feared that South Vietnam could not be saved, but in the context of the global war on communism, few believed that it was politically and strategically acceptable for the United States to allow South Vietnam to fall without putting up more of a fight. If the United States was truly dedicated to the preservation of a non-Communist South Vietnam, a few senior officials believed that the United States would have no choice but to deploy large ground forces in a bid to defeat the Communists militarily, or at least to bring them to the negotiation table on favorable terms, as had occurred in Korea. Others thought that a full-fledged war was undesirable, unlikely to achieve victory, and domestically unsustainable. They preferred using limited military means to coerce the Communists into accepting South Vietnam's independence. No one in the U.S. government, however, seemed to have a clear vision of how the crisis might end if the Communist leadership in Hanoi refused to be cowered. Unfortunately, North Vietnam's leaders had no intention of backing down. Although they feared U.S. military intervention, they regarded the reunification of Vietnam under communism as nonnegotiable, and they were prepared to pay a steep price to obtain it. The two nations were thus on a collision course. One, North Vietnam, was advancing aggressively forward toward conquering South Vietnam. The other, the United States, was moving hesitantly and with ambivalence toward a deeper involvement of undetermined proportions to save South Vietnam. Neither antagonist had a firm grasp on a situation that would soon spiral out of control.

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