Includes bibliographical references (pages 308-317) and index.

This provides an introduction to the politics and recent history of Northern Ireland. It probes the underlying realities of war and peace to address such key issues as: Why did 'the troubles' erupt in the late 1960s and why did the intercommunal violence escalate and continue so long?; Why did the first 'peace process' in 1972-74 fail and why has the current one, despite frequent crises, make more progress?; Why did the Irish government lobby against a British withdrawal in the 1970s?; Why did the government of Margaret Thatcher, a unionist and hardliner on security, sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and engage in secret contacts with the IRA?; Has British security policy been biased against the nationalist community?; Is a united Ireland likely or inevitable? It is crucial to understand the interplay of the 'physical' struggle with the accompanying ideological 'propaganda war' in Northern Ireland. The 'demonisation' of enemies in the propaganda conflict resulted in a growing discrepancy between the publics rhetoric of politicians and underlying, and sometimes privately acknowledged, 'realities'. A growing realisation among each of the rival parties, governments and paramilitary groups, of their limited power to achieve their goals laid a basis for a search for common ground. A consequence of this has been the need for them to de-escalate the propaganda war and educate their respective constituencies of the need to make hard compromises. This book's account of the 'peace process' since 1994 systematically assesses their attempt to do so, revealing both the constraints and the opportunities in their attempts to build a stable peaceful settlement. -- Publisher description

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